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often say that when patients forgo their right to sue, the health care
industry strips them of a valuable right at a time when they might
be at their most vulnerable. Despite this apparent lack of
consumer confidence, many Managed Care Organizations
1
(MCOs) and private physicians are trying to contain the rising
costs of health care by asking patients to give up their rights to sue
2
prior to receiving insurance coverage or medical care. In addition,
some state legislatures are enacting laws aimed at directing health3
related claims to arbitration, and both state and federal courts
continue to give Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) a ringing
4
endorsement.
While the critics of arbitration seem to have the loudest voices,
preliminary studies show that the majority of patients are still
5
willing to sign the agreements. Skeptics assume that for a wronged

1. Patricia I. Carter, Binding Arbitration in Malpractice Disputes: The Right
Prescription of HMO Patients?, HAMLINE J. PUB. & POL’Y 423, 424-25 (1997) (defining
managed care as “a combination of techniques intended to assure that the covered
individuals receive the most appropriate level and duration of care at the most
appropriate price”). Managed care programs take a variety of forms, including
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO), Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMO), and Individual Practice Organizations (IPO). Id. at 425. Twenty percent
of Americans are members of HMOs. Id. While HMOs have been the most
financially successful, they are the most restrictive in retaining control over the
price and quantity of health care services they provide to their members. Id. at
426. This article will refer generally to Managed Care Organizations (MCO) as
encompassing the different types of organizations.
2. See, e.g., Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 24 A.L.R.5th 1, 1 (1994) (stating that “because of what has been
characterized as a ‘medical malpractice insurance crisis,’ contributed to by the cost
of litigation and large jury verdicts in medical malpractice actions, attention has
focused on arbitration as a less expensive and more efficient method of dispute
resolution”); Carter, supra note 1, at 424 (noting that the health care industry is
under public pressure to limit rising health care costs and that by incorporating
binding arbitration agreements into member services contracts with patients,
managed care organizations have been able to reduce their costs in the manner of
handling disputes with patients); Jane Spencer, Signing Away Your Right to Sue—In
Significant Legal Shift, Doctors, Gyms, Cable Services Start to Require Arbitration, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 1, 2003, at D1 (stating that in an effort to fend off a growing number of
lawsuits, more and more companies are asking consumers to sign “mandatory
arbitration” agreements and waive their right to sue the company in the event a
dispute should arise).
3. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (Michie 2003); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT.
15/1-14 (2004).
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. Interview with Keith Maurer, Associate General Counsel, National
Arbitration Forum (Jan. 30, 2004). In one Florida hospital, during the first month
of a program offering arbitration agreements, 1576 out of 2683, or nearly sixty
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party arbitration provides a less-than-adequate substitute for the
6
court system. In addition, skeptics believe that providers put
arbitration clauses into contracts only to benefit corporations at the
7
expense of the individual bringing a claim. Legal grounds for
patients’ attacks on arbitration agreements most often rest on
assertions that MCOs and private physicians are stripping them of
the right to due process by coercing them into signing something
8
they do not want to sign. Similarly, arbitration opponents often
argue that courts should not enforce such agreements after a
dispute arises because such an agreement is unconscionable under
9
basic contract principles.
This anti-arbitration approach runs
counter to a growing body of statutory and case law at the federal
and state levels favoring arbitration as a fair and efficient means to
10
resolve disputes.
The assumption that signing an arbitration
agreement precludes patients from being able to rectify wrongs
through legal channels also overlooks the fact that arbitration does
not prevent parties from obtaining compensation for civil wrongs;
it simply provides a different forum for dispute resolution.
In fact, many feel that arbitration is not only a different forum,
11
but also a better option for would-be litigants.
Numerous
percent of admissions chose to sign the agreement. The percentage has
continued to climb. Id.
6. Interview with Roger S. Haydock, Director, Institute for Advanced Dispute
Resolution; Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; Director, National
Arbitration Forum in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Haydock
Interview].
7. Id.
8. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 53
(1997) (noting the commonality of the health industry requiring customers to
agree to binding arbitration as a condition of receiving health services); Spencer,
supra note 2, at D1.
9. See infra Part III.C (discussing how courts have interpreted arbitration
agreements in health care contracts). See also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the
unconscionability analysis used by courts to assess the validity of certain contract
clauses).
10. See Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer D. Henderson, Arbitration and Judicial
Civil Justice: An American Historical Review and a Proposal for a Private/Arbitral and
Public/Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 176 (2002) (stating that
over the course of the seventy-five years since the enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), both Congress and the United States Supreme Court have
demonstrated clear support of the expanded use of arbitration as an accessible,
affordable, and fair way to resolve disputes and provide civil justice relief for
everyone in American society).
11. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
(“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate . . . a party does not forgo the substantive rights . . . ; it
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arbitration supporters believe that arbitration is inherently a better
way to resolve disputes because it is faster, cheaper, and at least as
12
fair as litigation.
Some argue that the expense of litigation,
combined with the minute chance that one’s case will actually get
to trial, has essentially rendered the tort system inaccessible to the
13
average litigant. Under this view, the right to arbitrate a dispute is
more valuable to a potential claimant than the right to sue, and the
14
absence of an arbitration clause takes away that right.
Those who oppose arbitration clauses in health care contracts
as being a way for the health care industry to exploit consumers
must recognize that ADR may be a better option for patients with a
dispute. While this may be true, a well-developed body of contract
law dictates that patients must be able to enter into an agreement
to arbitrate without being coerced. Drafters must carefully word
contracts between patients and health care providers to reflect the
need to protect consumers.
While patients and consumer advocates must have an open
mind about the possible benefits of ADR, the onus is on the health
care industry to provide a balance between advocating for ADR and
protecting patients’ due process rights. The industry must create
an environment in which patients see arbitration as a superior
option to litigation. Health care providers must provide the

only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum”)
(internal citations omitted).
12. Haydock & Henderson, supra note 10, at 191; see also Schwartz, supra note
8, at 67.
13. Haydock & Henderson, supra note 10, at 191.
A system that costs a lot of money to participate in, takes way too
long to reach a final decision, requires help from a monopolistic
profession, and may include unpredictable
and
inadequately
knowledgeable decision makers has to be avoided. It can only serve
the rich and those that can wait a long time for results which they
can afford to appeal and wait even longer.
Id. See also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a
System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (focusing on why settlement
is so pervasive in today’s society). Out of the hundreds of thousands of civil
lawsuits that are filed each year, the great majority are settled and only a small
percentage are tried to a jury or a judge. Id. Some proposed reasons for this
phenomenon include, scarcity of judges, the ability of the parties themselves to
control settlement, and the fact that adversary fact-finding is expensive and
unpredictable. Id. at 3. As a result of these factors, Gross and Sylverud contend
that the savings realized by settling privately—in time, money, and risk—are
greater in the current system than they would be in a quicker, cheaper, and more
predictable system. Id. at 4.
14. Haydock & Henderson, supra note 10, at 191.
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necessary education, carefully drafted contracts, and appropriate
procedural safeguards fundamental to a viable system of ADR. If
doctors, hospitals, and MCOs are vigilant in implementing these
goals, patients will likely flow with the tide of pro-arbitration
sentiment currently sweeping the nation’s courts and lawmakers.
This article will begin by describing the peculiar nature of the
analysis of arbitration clauses in health care contracts, including
the complexity that arises when trying to categorize issues as
15
sounding in either tort or contract. Next, the article will examine
both statutory and case law governing arbitration agreements in
general, how courts have analyzed arbitration agreements under
16
the substantive law of contract, and how courts have applied that
17
analysis to arbitration clauses in health-related contracts. Lastly,
the article will propose some concrete steps providers can take to
correct the sort of appearance of impropriety that causes critics,
commentators, and patients themselves to be suspicious of these
18
agreements.
II. THE COMPLEXITY OF ANALYZING HEALTH CARE CONTRACTS:
CONTRACT OR TORT?
Maintaining high quality while containing the rising costs of
19
medical care is at the root of every health care contract. Often,
disputes that arise from these agreements can be contract claims,
20
tort claims, or both. The line between where an insurance-related
contract dispute ends and where a malpractice claim begins is often
fuzzy. Courts, however, must often characterize issues as being one
21
or the other, thus dictating a patient’s remedies.
To illustrate the problem, a “contract” decision made by an
MCO may result in a physical injury to a patient, and thus the two
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.A-B.
17. See infra Part III.C.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See Crocca, supra note 2, at 1.
20. Id. at 24. See also Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and Standard Form
Contracts: Distinguishing Patient Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 24 (1998) (“managed care brought together
elements of health insurance and patient care that traditionally have been
handled separately by the law”).
21. See Mariner, supra note 20, at 24. For example, in Corcoran v. United
HealthCare, Inc., the court held that United HealthCare in fact made medical
decisions, but only in the context of the availability of benefits. 965 F.2d 1321,
1331 (5th Cir. 1992). Therefore, any tort actions were preempted by ERISA. Id.
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22

areas of law bleed together in a sometimes indiscernible way. In
analyzing the validity of binding arbitration clauses, courts may
apply the same legal principles that govern standard commercial
23
agreements to health care contracts. However, those same courts
will use tort law when assessing whether a health care professional
provided care to a patient that conforms to the standard of care
24
required in a certain community.
This dual approach can be
problematic in cases involving benefit decisions that influence
patient care because “benefit decisions are typically governed by
contract, while patient care decisions are typically governed by tort
25
law.” If contracts govern “benefit” decisions, then it is essentially
impossible to hold a health plan accountable for its influence on
26
quality of care. The courts’ approach to these types of decisions
raises questions as to whether analyzing claims under the rubric of
contract strips patients of their rights against their MCO that would
27
normally be grounded in tort.
Take, for example, the question of whether the choice to use
one particular hospital instead of another should be considered a
decision about particular benefits a patient is entitled to (a contract
issue), or about the quality of care he or she will receive at the
hospital (a tort issue). In Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan Inc.,
physicians agreed that a man who suffered a heart attack should
have surgery at a St. Louis hospital because the hospitals in Kansas
28
City did not have adequate equipment. The health plan denied
22. See Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089, 1093-94 (Pa. 2001) (holding that
ERISA did not preempt the medical malpractice claim against the HMO in light of
the Supreme Court’s recent decision of Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228-29
(2000)). The Pappas court explains the three types of decisions that HMO
professionals make, as defined by the Supreme Court in Pegram. These decisions
include: pure “eligibility decisions,” which turn on a plan’s coverage of a particular
condition; “treatment decisions,” which are those that involve determining the
appropriate medical response given a patient’s symptoms; and “mixed eligibility
and treatment decisions,” where coverage and medical judgment are intertwined.
Pappas, 768 A.2d at 1093-94.
23. Crocca, supra note 2, at 25.
24. Id.
25. Mariner, supra note 20, at 24-25.
26. See id. at 26. Mariner points out some other ways that managed care
organizations can influence patient care. For example, health care plans
sometimes offer advice and assistance in selecting physicians, they may encourage
their members to use preventive care services, or they may create incentives for
health care providers themselves to recommend certain drugs or treatments. Id. at
27.
27. See id. at 28.
28. Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat’l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 300 (8th Cir. 1993).
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him that opportunity, stating that he had to use one of its listed
29
providers, but changed its mind several weeks later. By the time
the surgical team at the St. Louis hospital was available to perform
30
the surgery, Kuhl’s heart had deteriorated beyond repair. Kuhl
died in December 1989, before the health plan had made its final
decision about whether it would cover a transplant, and his wife
31
sued the plan for medical malpractice. The Eighth Circuit held
that there was no valid malpractice claim because the plan did not
make a medical decision per se; rather the court characterized the
claim for denial of benefits as sounding in contract law rather than
32
tort.
The court’s decision in Kuhl fails to recognize the medical
treatment choices made by the plan in the process of denying
33
benefits.
Simply because the provider’s decision was not
specifically about what benefits Kuhl was entitled to receive, but
where he would receive them, the substance of the decision should
34
not remove the claim from the realm of tort law.
An arbitration clause may not directly address standards of
patient care, but courts have acknowledged that the relationship
between a patient and his or her health care provider is one that
35
requires protection.
Thus, the courts have scrutinized these
agreements carefully and have approached health care contracts as
36
being ones of adhesion. The delicate nature of negotiating for
health care and a patient’s ability to seek redress for wrongs may
partially explain some of the trepidation people feel in signing
arbitration clauses.

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 303.
33. Mariner, supra note 20, at 26.
34. Id. (stating that at the very least, the plan’s decision about what hospital
Kuhl was entitled to use had elements of medical judgment for a covered benefit
because most plans would consider the quality of care in selecting hospitals with
which to work).
35. Crocca, supra note 2, at 25.
36. Id.
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III. ARBITRATION: LAW AND POLICY
A. Federal and State Arbitration Law
In general, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs
37
arbitration disputes. The United States Supreme Court has held
that the FAA applies to all arbitrations involving interstate
commerce, construing interstate commerce broadly and thereby
38
encompassing most agreements.
The FAA states that any
arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
39
revocation of any contract.”
Courts have consistently
acknowledged that Congress created a strong federal policy that
40
favors arbitration agreements through the language of the FAA.
37. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
38. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 2037, 2040 (2003) (interpreting
“the term ‘involving commerce’ in the FAA as the functional equivalent of the
more familiar term ‘affecting commerce’—words of art that ordinarily signal the
broadest permissible exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power”); AlliedBruce Terminix, Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995) (stating that a broad
interpretation of interstate commerce language “is consistent with the Act’s basic
purpose, to put arbitration provisions on ‘the same footing’ as a contract’s other
terms”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987) (stating that a broad
interpretation “embodies Congress’ intent to provide for the enforcement of
arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause”); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984) (holding that the requirement that the
transaction involve commerce is a constitutionally necessary qualification on the
FAA’s reach).
39. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). This section of the FAA states in full:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
Id.
40. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (holding that “it is the congressional policy manifested in the
Federal Arbitration Act that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of
arbitration agreements covered by that Act”); Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 15
(stating that by implementing language that an arbitration provision is valid and
irrevocable, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew
power of the states to require a judicial forum for resolution of claims that the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 n.27 (1983) (stating that “the policy of the
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Given this government attitude favoring arbitration, courts
resolving doubts as to the arbitrability of a claim must resolve any
41
doubts in favor of arbitration.
State governments have joined Congress by incorporating
aspects of the FAA into their own state laws, and crafting laws that
42
address issues specifically related to arbitration. While state law
governing arbitration can broaden the scope of arbitrable disputes,
the Supreme Court has held that the FAA preempts state laws and

Arbitration Act requires a liberal reading of arbitration agreements”).
41. Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 392 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting
that “[i]t is a well-established rule that any doubts regarding arbitrability should be
resolved in favor of arbitration”); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co.,
992 F.2d 386, 388 (1st Cir. 1993).
42. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 9.43.10-.220 (Michie 2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
12-1501 to -1518 (West 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-108-201 to -224 (WESTLAW
through 2003 legislation); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to -409 (WESTLAW
through 2003 legislation); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (WESTLAW
through 2003 legislation); FLA. STAT. ch. 682.01-682.22 (WESTLAW through 2003
legislation); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901 to -922 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2003
legislation); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-5/23 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§
34-57-2-2 to -22 (West, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
679A.1-.19 (West, WESTLAW through 2003 ch. 35) (recognized as preempted by
Faber v. Menard, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Iowa 2003)); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
5-401 to -422 (WESTLAW through 2002 legislation); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
417.045-.240 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 9:4201-:4217 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-5949 (West,
WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201
to -234 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 119 (West, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation ch. 9); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
600.5001-.5035 (West, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); MINN. STAT. §§
572.08-.30 (WESTLAW through 2001 1st Spec. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-1
to -37 (WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470
(WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to -324
(WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2601 to -2622
(WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); NEV. REV. STAT. 38.015-.360 (1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23A-1 to -19 (West, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -22 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 7503-7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-569.1 to
.31 (WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.2-01 to -20
(1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-.16 (WESTLAW through 2003
legislation); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 801-818 (WESTLAW through 2003 legislation);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7301-7320 (1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-3-1 to -21
(WESTLAW through 2002 legislation); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-25A-1 to -38
(WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to -320
(WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); TEX. CIV. PRAC & REM. CODE ANN. §§
171.001-.023 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31a-1 to -20 (1996); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5651-5681 (WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8.01-581.01 to -.016 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2002 legislation).
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policies regarding arbitration where state court rulings or statutes
43
are contrary or more restrictive. In Perry v. Thomas, the Supreme
Court held:
State law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is
applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning
the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts
generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning
precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at
44
issue does not comport with [the text] of [the FAA].
Therefore, while states may invalidate an arbitration clause
“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity of the revocation of
any contract” under section 2 of the FAA, a state cannot “decide
that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price,
service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration
45
clause.”
While the FAA preempts state statutory schemes that are more
restrictive, state contract principles apply to whether agreements to
arbitrate are valid and enforceable, just as they would to any other
46
contract dispute arising under state law. As the Seventh Circuit
stated in Stone v. Doerge, decided in May 2003:
Nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act overrides normal
rules of contractual interpretation; the Act’s goal was to
put arbitration on a par with other contracts and
eliminate any vestige of old rules disfavoring arbitration.
Arbitration depends on agreement, and nothing beats
normal rules of contract law to determine what the
47
parties’ agreement entails.
43. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995); AlliedBruce, 513 U.S. at 271-72; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10-11; Fazio, 340 F.3d at 39293.
44. 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
45. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281. See also Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687
(stating that “courts may not . . . invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws
applicable only to arbitration provisions”).
46. Stone v. Doerge, 328 F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that federal
law affects the “extent to which state law may specify special rules for arbitration:
any rule of state law disfavoring or prohibiting arbitration for a class of
transactions is preempted, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract”).
47. Id. (citations omitted). The court also states that “generally applicable
rules of New York contract law govern, but any rules of state law that give special
treatment to arbitration agreements are inapplicable.” Id. See also Fazio, 340 F.3d
at 393; Great Earth Co. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 889 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that
state law determines whether the agreement to arbitrate was validly obtained and
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The FAA leaves state courts to use the contract law of their
state to interpret the validity of the agreement to arbitrate itself.
The federal policy requiring liberal construction of arbitration
clauses mandates that state courts construe applicable law in favor
48
of arbitration.
B. State Contract Law: Interpreting the Validity of Arbitration Clauses
Before a court is justified in granting a motion to compel
arbitration, it must engage in a two-step process governed by state
49
rather than federal law. First, the court must determine whether a
valid agreement to arbitrate exists and then whether the issues
50
involved fall within the scope of the agreement.
A court may
invalidate an arbitration agreement for the same reasons it might
invalidate any contract—including forgery, unconscionability, or
51
lack of consideration.
The Stone court notes that mandating
courts to favor arbitration when possible is not the same as
requiring courts to “foist arbitration on parties who have not
the FAA preempts any state laws that are specific to arbitration); Doctor’s Assocs.,
517 U.S. at 686-87; First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
48. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 992 F.2d 386, 388 (1st
Cir. 1993) (stating that policy favoring arbitration “applies whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”).
49. See Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, U.S., L.L.C. v. Nackel, 346 F.3d 360, 365
(2nd Cir. 2003) (stating that before “compelling arbitration, the district court
must first determine two threshold issues that are governed by state rather than
federal law”: first, whether or not the parties entered into a contractually valid
arbitration agreement; and second, whether the dispute itself falls within the
scope of the agreement). See also Fazio, 340 F.3d at 393 (citing Stout v. J.D.
Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S 614, 628 (1985). The Sixth Circuit said in Stout
that “[w]hen considering a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration
under the Act, a court has four tasks: first, it must determine whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate; second, it must determine the scope of that agreement.” Stout,
228 F.3d at 714. The court went on to add two more prongs to the analysis by
saying that “third, if federal statutory claims are asserted, it must consider whether
Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court
concludes that some, but not all of the claims in the action are subject to
arbitration, it must determine whether to stay the remainder of the proceedings
pending arbitration.” Id. See also Bratt Enters., Inc., v. Nobel Int’l Ltd., 338 F.3d
609, 612 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that “a court must engage in a limited review to
determine whether the dispute is arbitrable; meaning that a valid agreement to
arbitrate exists between the parties and that the specific dispute falls within the
substantive scope of that agreement”).
50. Cap Gemini, 346 F.3d. at 365.
51. Fazio, 340 F.3d at 393.
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52

genuinely agreed to that device.” While that may be true, given
the FAA’s strong policy favoring arbitration and the equally
powerful policy favoring the freedom to contract as one of the
fundamental tenets underlying American jurisprudence,
convincing a court to invalidate an arbitration agreement is
53
difficult.
1. Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts
Contracts of adhesion may contain arbitration agreements.
Because the contracts this article discusses are generally between an
MCO and one consumer, usually a patient, the analysis will focus
on what is necessary to enforce a valid adhesion contract.
Simply put, an adhesion contract is a contract in which one
party dictates the terms of the agreement to the other party, and
54
the other party has no voice in its formulation. Legal scholars and
courts have developed more detailed definitions, including:
(1) a standardized (typed or printed) form document (2)
drafted by, or on behalf of, one party which (3)
participates routinely in numerous like transactions and
(4) presents the form to the other “adhering” party on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis; (5) the adhering party enters into
few transactions of the type in question, and (6) the
adhering party signs the form after dickering over the few
55
terms, if any, that are open to bargaining.
One scholar characterized the process of entering into a
contract of adhesion as being “not one of haggle or cooperative
56
process but rather of a fly and flypaper.”
One commonly cited negative aspect of adhesion contracts is
52. Stone v. Doerge, 328 F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2003).
53. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 36-37 (stating that the Supreme Court has
broadly endorsed the enforcement of adhesive pre-dispute arbitration agreements
and has created a “doctrine of rigorous enforcement” of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses); Haydock & Henderson, supra note 10, at 175 (stating that judicial
opinions and congressional action through the FAA show clear support of use of
methods of alternative dispute resolution instead of litigation to resolve issues).
54. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4 (1993).
55. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 55 (citing Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983)). Professor
Schwartz notes that he refers only to six of the seven factors Professor Rakoff uses
in his original definition, omitting the last component that “the adhering party’s
primary obligation is the payment of money,” because Professor Schwartz feels
that Professor Rakoff’s analysis applies to not only consumer contracts, but
contracts of employment as well. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1191 n.61.
56. Arthur Leff, Contract as a Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 143 (1970).
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that the drafters, usually a much larger entity than the adhering
party, may draft the contract to protect their best interests, making
57
it less likely that the adhering party’s expectations will be met.
Most analyses of adhesion contracts also include an evaluation of
the disparity of bargaining power between the contract’s drafter
58
and the adherent that often accompanies such agreements.
Additionally, there is likely to be “disparate knowledge” between
the parties, causing the adhering party to be disadvantaged by a
lack of information about a certain term and, in the case of
arbitration, about the likelihood and nature of any future disputes
59
that may arise. Courts closely examine those situations in which
the contracting parties have conflicting interests, making it more
likely that the stronger party might take advantage of the adhering
60
party by skewing the terms in its favor.
While there are clearly issues of fairness raised by adhesion
contracts, scholars note that there is nothing inherently wrong with
them. Furthermore, many if not most daily, common transactions
involve contracts drafted by one party and presented on a take-it-or61
leave-it basis.
Plaintiffs in health care contracts cases often try to invalidate
62
arbitration clauses on the basis of unconscionability.
Patients
make some of the following arguments when attacking an
arbitration clause: an individual was forced to sign the agreement
and had no meaningful choice because the service at the heart of
the contract was public or essential; the arbitration clause binds
one party but not the other and is therefore not mutual; it is
prohibitively costly for an individual to participate in the
arbitration process; the arbitration process or the arbitrator is not
neutral or independent; or the clause unreasonably reduces an
63
individual’s rights, for example, by denying remedies.
57. PERILLO, supra note 54, § 1.4.
58. Schwartz, supra note 8, 55.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 56.
61. PERILLO, supra note 54, § 29.10. See also id. § 1.4 (stating that “[adhesion
contracts exist] in many of the transactions of vast scale that are of great
importance to the functioning of the economy” and that they are a “part of the
fabric of our society. [Contracts of adhesion] should neither be praised nor
denounced by the legal scholar”).
62. While there are many other contract-based challenges to arbitration
clauses, unconscionability is most relevant to the discussion of procedural
safeguards and due process rights, and the article will focus on it.
63. See Roger S. Haydock, Arbitration, in MINNESOTA PRACTICE (forthcoming

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
GALLE-FINAL.DOC

982

3/30/2004 10:41 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

2. Unconscionability Analysis
Courts have defined unconscionability as “an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
64
party.”
Courts have further tried to clarify the concept by
distinguishing
between
procedural
and
substantive
65
Procedural unconscionability relates to the
unconscionability.
bargaining process resulting in the agreement, while substantive
unconscionability examines whether the terms of the agreement
66
itself are oppressive. To invalidate an agreement to arbitrate, a
court must find that there is both procedural and substantive
67
unconscionability.
Procedural unconscionability exists when the parties to a
68
contract did not freely bargain for it. Indications of procedural
unconscionability generally fall into two categories: lack of
69
To determine whether
voluntariness and lack of knowledge.
there was a lack of voluntariness in forming the contract, courts
look at “the use of high-pressure tactics, coercion, oppression, or
threats short of duress, or by a great imbalance between the parties’
70
bargaining power.” Non-negotiable terms on the stronger party’s
side, or prevention of the weaker party from negotiating more
71
favorable terms, denotes unequal bargaining power. The terms
might prevent the weaker party from negotiating such things as
72
market factors or timing.
Lack of knowledge manifests in the
classic forms of small print, indecipherable or ambiguous language,
or lack of the opportunity to study the contract and ask about its
73
terms.
Obvious disparities in sophistication, knowledge, and
experience between the parties may lead to procedural
74
unconscionability.

publication) (manuscript at 12-13, on file with author).
64. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
65. Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 72 P.3d 877, 882 (Idaho 2003).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/1

14

Galle: The Appearance of Impropriety: Making Agreements to Arbitrate in
GALLE-FINAL.DOC

2004]

3/30/2004 10:41 PM

AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE IN HEALTH CARE

983

On the other hand, substantive unconscionability focuses
75
solely on the term or provision at issue in a particular case.
Courts have long drawn on a definition dating back to eighteenthcentury England stating that a substantively unconscionable
bargain is one “no [person] in [his or her] senses and not under
delusion would make on the one hand, and . . . no honest and fair
76
[person] would accept on the other.” Courts must consider the
purpose and effect of the terms at issue, whether those terms are
oppressive or exceedingly one-sided in light of the needs of both
parties, the commercial setting in which the parties executed the
agreement, and the reasonableness of the terms at the time the
77
parties contracted.
Another specific concern arising in relation to arbitration
clauses in all kinds of contracts is that because the transaction
might center around wages, price, or medical services provided,
and the arbitration clause may not be at the essence of the
transaction, the adhering party is not likely to pay much attention
78
to the clause. Even if average citizens do read and understand the
clause, most probably do not have a great deal of experience with
either arbitration or litigation, a fact that might lead to an
79
undervaluation of the right to a judicial forum.
Plaintiffs have challenged many arbitration clauses on the
80
grounds of unconscionability, but the challenges usually fail. This
is likely due to the string of United States Supreme Court decisions
making “it clear that arbitration is a preferred method of dispute
81
resolution.” Courts have held that an arbitration clause requiring
“a forum with excessively high fees is unconscionable in a

75. Id.
76. Id.; see also PERILLO, supra note 54, at § 29.4 (quoting Earl of Chesterfield
v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750)).
77. Lovey, 72 P.3d at 883. See also PERILLO, supra note 54, at § 29.4 (stating
that under Official Comment 1 to the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302, “the
ultimate question is ‘whether, in the light of general commercial background and
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of
the making of the contract’ ”).
78. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 56-57.
79. Id. at 57.
80. PERILLO, supra note 54, at § 29.4 (citing Young v. Jim Walter Homes, 110
F. Supp. 2d 1344 (M.D. Ala. 2000); Green Tree Fin. Corp. of Ala. v. Wampler, 749
So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1999); Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D. Del.
1999); Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 28 P.3d 823 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)).
81. PERILLO, supra note 54, § 29.4.
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consumer transaction with a relatively small amount at issue.”
However, “the mere fact that a party cannot afford the normal
83
arbitration fees does not create a defense of unconscionability.”
In a related matter, courts have held that employment
contracts containing arbitration clauses that bind only the
employee but not the employer are unconscionable for lack of
84
mutuality. In an unpublished California Court of Appeals case,
the court held that an arbitration clause in an employment
contract was procedurally unconscionable because signing it was a
condition of being hired, and the clause was substantively
unconscionable because it did not require the employer to submit
85
its claims to arbitration. The court also considered that the clause
required the employee to pay one-half of the fees for arbitration
and required that the arbitration take place before judges that
86
charged high prices.
Pre-dispute arbitration clauses contained in adhesion contracts
raise issues of fairness and due process, but they are permissible
87
and enforceable. Reflecting the analysis outlined above, courts
will generally uphold arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts as
long as the arbitration terms are not procedurally and substantively
88
unconscionable. Most courts will protect parties to an adhesion
contract involving public or essential services if the parties have
greatly disparate bargaining power, there was no opportunity for
89
negotiation, and the parties could not obtain services elsewhere.
C. How the Courts Have Interpreted Arbitration Clauses in HealthRelated Contracts: Case Law
The Supreme Court of the United States has not directly
addressed the validity of an agreement to arbitrate in health care
90
The Court has addressed the issue of arbitration
contracts.
82. Id. (citing Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. 1998)).
83. Id. (citing Fleetwood Enters., Inc., v. Bruno, 784 So. 2d 277 (Ala. 2000)).
84. Id. (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs. Inc., 6 P.3d 669
(Cal. 2000)).
85. Id. (citing McCoy v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. App. 4th 354 (2001)).
86. Id.
87. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 681 (1996).
88. See Haydock, supra note 63, at 7.
89. Id. at 11.
90. While not directly related to the focus on patients’ rights that this article
takes, the Supreme Court’s decision in PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., v. Book, 123 S.
Ct. 1531 (2003), might be of interest. This case arose out of a lawsuit brought by
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clauses, but has not made a distinction between patients as
91
consumers of health care and other kinds of consumers.
However, the Supreme Court has approached arbitration clauses
with a great deal of deference, and each of the Justices who has
considered the issue has recognized the benefits of a well-run
92
arbitration system.
The federal courts of appeals have dealt with the question of
whether arbitration clauses in health care contracts should be
enforceable on a limited basis, concluding generally that such
clauses should and will be enforceable. For example, in Chappel v.
Laboratory Corp. of America, the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of
93
an arbitration clause in an ERISA-governed health benefits plan.
The Chappel court stated, “if the plan contains an arbitration clause,
the plaintiff must arbitrate the dispute in accordance with the
clause in order to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing
suit . . . unless he can show that the arbitration clause is
94
The plaintiff’s argument was
unenforceable or invalid.”
threefold: first, that the plan waived its right to arbitrate by first
physicians against MCOs that had failed to reimburse the doctors for patient
services. Id. at 1533. The doctors alleged, inter alia, that the organizations
violated the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Id.
When the MCOs moved to compel arbitration as per their agreements with the
doctors, the district court denied the motion stating, “the arbitration clauses [in
question] prohibited awards of ‘punitive damages,’ and hence an arbitrator lacked
the ability to award treble damages under RICO.” Id. at 1532. The Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the district court that given the remedial limitations in the
arbitration clauses, “[T]he plaintiff[s] may not be able to obtain meaningful relief
for allegations of statutory violations in an arbitration forum.” Id. at 1534 (quoting
In re Managed Care Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1005 (S.D. Fla. 2000)). In writing
for the Court, Justice Scalia held that since the remedial limitations in the
arbitration clauses themselves were ambiguous, and because the Court would have
to speculate as to how an arbitrator might construe the remedial limitations, that it
was not for the Court to resolve that ambiguity. Id. at 1535-36. The case was
remanded for further proceedings, and at the time of this publication has not
been decided. In CIGNA HealthCare of St. Louis, Inc. v. Kaiser, a Seventh Circuit
case, health care providers brought a claim against a group of affiliated
corporations that administered benefits, CIGNA, alleging that it installed a
computer program for calculating the amount it owed that resulted in systematic
underpayment. 294 F.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2002).
91. Haydock Interview, supra note 6.
92. Haydock & Henderson, supra note 10, at 175-76 (stating that all of the
twenty-four different justices who have been members of the Court since 1960
“were members of the majority upholding arbitration in at least one case during
their tenure, and [the majority of the Justices] were members of the majority a
number of times”).
93. 232 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000).
94. Id. at 724.
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litigating the dispute in federal court; second, that the clause
should be invalid because some of its terms were more restrictive
than the statutory rights guaranteed to plan participants under
ERISA; and third, that employment contracts are not governed
95
under the FAA. The court rejected all three claims and enforced
96
the arbitration clause.
To waive the right to arbitrate, the defendant must have
known of their right to arbitrate, “acted inconsistently with that
97
right, and, in doing so, prejudiced Chappel by their actions.” The
court said that nothing in the defendant’s litigation behavior was
98
As for the more
inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.
restrictive language in the arbitration agreement, the court held
that a cost-sharing provision did not render the arbitration
99
agreement unenforceable.
Finally, whether the plaintiff could
prove that the clause was part of the employment contract and thus
not governed by the FAA, he would still be required under the law
100
of contract to arbitrate in accordance with the clause. The court
did allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint to state a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty by failing to adequately notify him of the
101
existence and terms of the arbitration clause.
The court
reasoned that because mandatory arbitration was part of the plan’s
claim procedure, and because the claimant would have taken
certain steps to obtain external review of his claim, the plan should
102
have brought the arbitration clause to the claimant’s attention.
103
the Tenth Circuit
In Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield,
considered whether an arbitration award fell within the public
104
policy exception to enforcement of arbitration awards.
In that
case, the parties mutually agreed to arbitrate a claim against the
health care organization after it declined to pay for the plaintiff’s
95. Id. at 724-25.
96. Id. at 724.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 725.
Compare Chappel, 232 F.3d 719 with Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that a claim under
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) can be subjected to compulsory
arbitration, and the plaintiff was bound by the agreement unless he could show an
“inherent conflict between arbitration and the ADEA’s underlying purposes”).
100. Chappel, 232 F.3d at 725.
101. Id. at 726.
102. Id.
103. 988 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1993).
104. Id.
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105

son’s liver transplant.
The arbitration panel found that the
106
company was not legally obligated to pay for the transplant.
Because the Seymours claimed that Blue Cross unilaterally
modified the original policy without receiving a written agreement
from the Seymours, the court would not enforce the arbitration
107
award, finding it counter to Utah public policy.
Relying on
federal policy dictating that a federal court should do everything it
108
can to avoid overturning an arbitration award, the Seymour court
held that “as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
109
authority . . . error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”
Among state courts, California has had many cases involving
various issues related to health care arbitration clauses come before
110
its judiciary, paving the way for those that have followed. In 1976,
the California Supreme Court reversed the California Court of
Appeals in the seminal case of Madden v. Kaiser Foundation
111
Hospitals. This case involved a state employee covered by a group
health plan negotiated by his employer who brought a medical
105. Id. at 1022.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764 (1983)
(stating that “a federal court may not overrule an arbitrator’s decision simply
because the court believes its own interpretation of the contract would be a better
one”)).
109. Seymour, 988 F.2d at 1022-23 (quoting United Paperworks Int’l Union v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)).
110. See generally Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 972
(Cal. 1997) (presuming arbitratability); Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d
1178 (Cal. 1976) (finding that an agent or representative has the implied authority
to agree to arbitration of malpractice claims for enrolled employees); Zolezzi v.
Pacificare of California, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 526, 539 n.11 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not prevent the Federal Arbitration Act
from preempting application of statutory disclosure requirements for arbitration
clauses in health care service plans found in California state law); Pagarigan v.
Libby Care Center, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 895 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
arbitration clause in nursing home admissions contract was unenforceable because
adult children of resident who signed the agreement did not have authority as
agents to bind the resident); Smith v. PacifiCare Behavioral Health of California,
Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140, 162 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that where health service
plan was engaged in the business of insurance and was thus governed by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, an arbitration provision in a health services contract that
did not satisfy the statutory disclosure requirements was not enforceable); WarrenGuthrie v. Health Net, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260, 266 (Ct. App. 2000) (state law
allowing a court to disregard an arbitration clause due to the possibility of
inconsistent rulings was preempted by the FAA).
111. 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976).
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112

malpractice claim against the health plan. When Kaiser moved to
compel arbitration per the agreement it negotiated with the State
Employees Retirement System Board of Administration, the
plaintiff contended that the arbitration provision did not bind her
113
because she did not personally contract for it.
The court then
considered whether an agent or representative, contracting for
medical services on behalf of a group of employees, has the implied
authority to agree to arbitration of malpractice claims for enrolled
114
employees.
The California Supreme Court made several bold statements
115
The court stated that while in
about the practice of arbitration.
the past courts sometimes regarded arbitration as suspect, today
116
arbitration is an accepted mode of dispute resolution.
Further,
the court held that employers could enter into contracts related to
medical services on behalf of their employees, and that simply
because an arbitration agreement is embedded in an adhesion
117
contract does not make it invalid.
After all, the parties
negotiating for the arbitration contract had equal bargaining
118
power.
The Madden court finally noted that in negotiating the
arbitration clause, the employer (or state board) was merely
providing “a forum for enforcement of the rights of enrolled
119
employees rather than a substantive limitation of them.”
Along
those same lines, the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that
the arbitration provision violated her constitutional right to a jury
trial, because persons can freely contract to resolve disputes
120
through arbitration rather than by juries.
In 1997, the California Supreme Court considered an
arbitration provision in another health care contract in Engalla v.
121
Permanente Medical Group, Inc. The court first looked to see if the
122
arbitration clause itself was unconscionable.
The court noted in
its analysis that in addition to the doctrine of unconscionability
112. Id. at 1180-81.
113. Id. at 1181.
114. Id. at 1180.
115. See id. (stating that “courts in the past regarded arbitration as an unusual
and suspect procedure”).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
122. Id. at 924.
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derived from contract law, HMOs were regulated by a state law that
required that “all contracts made in connection with a health
service plan be ‘fair, reasonable, and consistent with the objectives’
123
of that statute.”
Therefore, the court concluded, “HMOs had a
special obligation not to impose contracts on their subscribers that
124
are one-sided and lacking in fundamental fairness.”
While the
court acknowledged that the contract had some of the attributes of
adhesion, it held that the agreement was not unconscionable
because the plaintiff’s argument did not revolve around any defect
125
or one-sidedness in its contractual provisions; rather, the plaintiff
argued that the HMO had set up a system of arbitration inherently
126
unfair to its claimants. The court then remanded the case on the
127
issues of fraud and waiver.
In another prominent state court case, Broemmer v. Abortion
Services of Phoenix, Ltd., the Supreme Court of Arizona revisited a
decision holding that an adhesion contract, which had required
Broemmer to arbitrate a medical malpractice claim, thereby
128
waiving her right to a jury trial, was unconscionable.
To
determine whether the clause was enforceable, the court examined
whether the provision fell within the reasonable expectations of the
129
plaintiff. Because of the complexities of that particular situation,
the court chose not to enforce the agreement to arbitrate, stating
that the contract itself fell outside Broemmer’s reasonable
130
expectations.
The court said that there was neither a
conspicuous or explicit waiver of her right to a jury trial, nor any
evidence that she waived the right knowingly, voluntarily, and
131
intelligently.
The court also noted that at the time of the
decision Broemmer was still not sure what arbitration entailed, and
that severe emotional strain, coupled with her lack of education,
contributed to the court’s assessment that the clause did not
123. Id. (citing Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE, § 1367, subd. (h) (West 2004)).
124. Id. at 924.
125. Id. at 925.
126. Id. at 925. Kaiser, the HMO in this case, reserved an unlimited right to
veto arbitrators proposed by the other party. Id. The plaintiffs also argued that
Kaiser had “an unfair advantage as a ‘repeat player’ in arbitration, possessing
information on arbitrators that [they] themselves lacked.” Id.
127. Id.
128. 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992).
129. Id at 1016.
130. Id. at 1017.
131. Id.
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132

coincide with her reasonable expectations.
The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, went the other
direction, compelling arbitration in a case between a patient and
133
her physician.
In considering whether such an agreement was
134
valid under the Tennessee Arbitration Act, the court examined
whether the clause was contained in a contract of adhesion, and if
135
so, whether the contract was enforceable.
The test for
enforceability used by the Buraczynski court was to ascertain
whether the terms of the contract were beyond the reasonable
136
expectations of an ordinary person.
In this case, two different
plaintiffs brought medical malpractice claims against the
137
defendant, Dr. Edward Eyring.
Since both patients had signed
agreements to arbitrate with the physician, he moved to compel
138
arbitration.
The court acknowledged that, in general, courts around the
nation are reluctant to enforce arbitration agreements between
139
patients and health care providers.
The court qualified this
statement by citing some specific strikes against certain types of
140
agreements.
For instance, courts do not favor agreements
hidden within other types of contracts that do not afford patients
an opportunity to question the terms or purpose of the
141
agreement. This is particularly true when a patient is required to
accept the terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and when the
agreements give the health care provider an unequal advantage in

132. Id.
133. Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 314 (Tenn. 1996).
134. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302(a) (1995).
135. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 320.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 316-17.
138. Id. at 317.
139. Id. at 320-21 (citing Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., 840
P.2d 1013, 1016 (Ariz. 1992); William F. Robinson, M.D., Ltd. v. Pepper, 693 P.2d
1259, 1261 (Nev. 1985) (refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement found
within a clinic admission form that gave the patient no option to revoke the
agreement and regain the right to a jury trial); Benyon v. Garden Grove Med.
Group, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (refusing to enforce an
arbitration clause where the group health insurance plan had the unilateral right
to reject an arbitrator’s decision without cause and to require another arbitration
before a panel of three physicians when the insured is unaware of the provision
and that the provision required the insured to pay half the costs of both
arbitrations)).
140. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 321.
141. Id.
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142

the arbitration process itself.
While the Buraczynski court conceded that the arbitration
agreement was contained in a contract of adhesion and presented
to the plaintiffs on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, it still chose to enforce
143
the agreement.
The court noted that the arbitration clause was
on a separate page attached to an explanation about arbitration
and an encouragement to discuss questions about the agreement
144
with Dr. Eyring.
The arbitration agreement equally bound Dr.
Eyring, and each side in the dispute had an opportunity to choose
the arbitrator. In addition, the arbitration agreement included a
ten-point, capital letter, red message directly above the signature
line. The message read, “by signing this contract, you are giving up
145
your right to a jury or court trial” on any malpractice claim.
Patients also had the right to revoke the agreement for any reason
within thirty days of its execution and regain the right to a jury
146
trial. Finally, the agreement did not limit the doctor’s liability for
negligence, but “merely shifted the disputes to a different
147
forum.” With these procedural safeguards in place, the court felt
that the arbitration procedure itself did not offer an unfair
148
advantage to the physician.
The Buraczynski court also engaged in a public policy analysis,
considering whether the arbitration agreements between physicians
149
and patients were void ab initio as against public policy. While the
court acknowledged the “unique relationship” between physician
and patient, it thought that arbitration was an advantageous
relationship because it was quicker, less expensive, relieves court
congestion, and in cases where the provisions did not limit liability,
150
simply provided a different forum for resolving disputes.
Other states have dealt with the issue of the enforcement of
arbitration agreements in health care contracts, usually finding the

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 319.
150. Id. at 318-19 (citing Stanley D. Henderson, Contractual Problems in the
Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REV. 947, 956
(1972); Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 84
A.L.R.3d 375, 377 (1978 & Supp. 1995)).
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151

arbitration agreements enforceable.
There are some cases in
which they are not enforceable, including when the arbitration is
152
prohibitively costly, the clause was proposed on a take-it-or-leaveit basis, the clause was “buried” on the tenth page of an eleven-page
agreement, the clause was written in the same size font as the rest
of the agreement, and the clause did not adequately describe how
153
the arbitration clause would work.
The Buraczynski opinion is
helpful in providing a list of possible dos and don’ts for health care
organizations in drafting arbitration clauses.
IV. MANAGING CONFLICTING GOALS
THROUGH PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Most people would not deny that health care providers and
insurers face a myriad of complex issues in trying to provide
adequate care for their patients while simultaneously containing
the cost. As previously noted, many operators in the health care
and health insurance industries are requiring customers to agree to
binding arbitration as a condition of both using hospital services
151. See, e.g., Cent. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Fox, No. 1011121, 2003 WL
21480608 (Ala. June 27, 2003) (enforcing an arbitration agreement between
health insurer and insured but invalidating “condition precedent” to appealability
of the decision because insurer waived conditions by moving to compel
arbitration); Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 381 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (holding
that arbitration clause in HMO contract applied to a wrongful death claim
brought by a non-party spouse as an “heir”); Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life &
Health, 23 P.3d 1249, 1255 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that an arbitration
clause was not void for lack of mutuality as long as the parties have provided each
other with adequate consideration beyond the promise to arbitrate); Consol. Res.
Healthcare Fund v. Fenelus, 853 So. 2d 500, 504-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(stating that an arbitration clause in nursing home admission agreement was not
unconscionable and thus enforceable even though clause did not allow signor a
chance to affirmatively release his right to trial); Murphy v. Mid-West Nat’l Life
Ins. Co. of Tenn., 78 P.3d 766, 768 (Idaho 2003) (holding that while there was no
showing that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable, the prohibitive costs
of arbitration rendered the provision unenforceable in a case where the fees were
$2500 for a case worth $10,000); Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 72 P.3d
877, 889 (Idaho 2003) (holding that the arbitration agreement in BlueShield
policy was not procedurally or substantively unconscionable); Jozwiak v. N. Mich.
Hosp. Inc., 586 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that repeal of
Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act did not retroactively invalidate arbitration
agreement).
152. Colo. Permanente Med. Group, P.C. v. Evans, 926 P.2d 1218, 1226 (Colo.
1996) (stating that an HMO must comply with the requirements for enforceable
arbitration clauses as laid out in Colorado’s Health Care Availability Act).
153. Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders, Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2003).
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154

and applying for health insurance.
The justification for these
agreements is generally the goal of furthering “two sometimes
155
mutually exclusive public policies.” Those public policies include
lowering medical malpractice insurance premiums by decreasing
the cost and frequency of medical malpractice litigation and
adequately compensating those injured by health care providers’
156
negligence.
Requiring consumers of managed care plans to
agree to an arbitration process in an adhesion contract raises
questions rooted in the conflict between being fair to patients and
157
administering effective, economically efficient care.
Binding
arbitration may provide a superior alternative to litigation for both
158
patients and managed care organizations.
It falls on the
shoulders of the proponents of arbitration to demonstrate to
patients and consumers that it is fair and equitable, and that the
outcomes are commensurate to that of litigation in the vast
majority of situations.
There are two competing viewpoints regarding the
159
enforceability of arbitration clauses in health care contracts. The
“pro-arbitration” approach focuses on the advantages and efficacy
of using an alternative method of dispute resolution while
sometimes neglecting to address the necessity for valid contract
160
formation.
ADR opponents, on the other hand, focus on the
illegitimacy of the arbitration agreement itself while often failing to
161
consider the benefits of ADR.
154. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 53; Symposium, ADR in Health Care, 16
WHITTIER L. REV. 61 (1995).
155. Weldon E. Havens, Medical Arbitration Agreements, 41 ORANGE COUNTY
LAWYER 14, 14 (1999).
156. Id.
157. See Carter, supra note 1, at 433 (stating that while arbitration is considered
to be speedier and less costly than litigation, there is concern, particularly in the
HMO field, that patients, in losing their right to a judicial hearing, will lose their
right to a fair hearing).
158. See Allied-Bruce Terminix, Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995)
(citing Congress’ intent that arbitration appeal to businesses, corporations, and
individuals).
159. See Havens, supra note 155, at 15 (stating medical arbitration contracts
ensure the continued availability of professional liability insurance to health care
providers, which in turn provides the best source of available funds to compensate
victims of medical malpractice).
160. See id. (providing support for arbitration clauses).
161. See Jennifer Gillespie, Physician-Patient Arbitration Agreements: Procedural
Safeguards May Not Be Enough, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 119 (1997) (stating that
many patients are being presented with the choice of signing an arbitration
agreement or forgoing treatment); Carter, supra note 1, at 423 (asserting that the
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The “pro-arbitration” approach is rooted in the belief that
arbitration is always better than litigation. Under this approach,
analysis of contract formation may be subverted to the end goal of
arbitration. At its negative extreme, this favors businesses over
consumers and seeks to protect large, powerful entities drafting
what amount to adhesion contracts that are likely to favor their own
162
interests and shift as much risk as possible to the adhering party.
In a more positive light, however, those who favor arbitration for
settling claims feel that these clauses benefit plaintiffs in a tort
system that large corporations with vast resources can easily
163
manipulate.
The contrasting approach focuses on the fact that plaintiffs
have forgone access to the tort system instead of on the efficacy and
fairness of the arbitration itself. These ADR opponents apparently
assume that giving up the right to a civil jury trial somehow
164
obliterates one’s ability to seek redress for wrongs.
Certainly
scrutinizing the manner in which parties form arbitration
agreements deserves attention, but it is not the only consideration.
Giving people access to a fair system in which they have an
opportunity to be heard is the ultimate goal of the American justice
system. Undeniably, most patients would never see the inside of a
courtroom if litigation was their only option.
The key is to seek balance. Arbitration may benefit all
involved in the long run, but notions of fair play demand that
165
people validly contract to use arbitration rather than litigation.
Perhaps more importantly, people need to feel that they are being
treated fairly within whatever system they have available to them to
resolve disputes, and health care providers can take steps to
safeguard due process as well as to educate patients and consumers
about the benefits of arbitration over litigation.
power of HMOs may skew the arbitration process and “pile poor legal care on top
of poor medical care”).
162. Haydock Interview, supra note 6.
163. See generally Haydock & Henderson, supra note 10 (laying out the essential
elements to a fair dispute resolution system).
164. See generally Schwartz, supra note 8, at 117 (stating that settlements
arguably deprive the public of a jury trial); Spencer, supra note 2, at D1 (reflecting
that critics of arbitration provisions equate no right to trial or appeal as a secondrate justice system).
165. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997)
(Kennard, J., concurring) (stating that private arbitration may resolve disputes
faster and cheaper than judicial proceedings, but that it may also become an
instrument of injustice if imposed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis).
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A. Education
Health care organizations must legitimize arbitration
agreements in the eyes of their patients by giving people more
confidence in them. This can happen only through education. At
this point, many people fear arbitration agreements because they
think that if something happens to them they will not be able to do
anything about it. This is not true; arbitration agreements merely
change the forum of the dispute. Before people will want to
engage in ADR, they must understand the trade-off; while they are
giving up one right, they are gaining another of equal or greater
value. Health care providers must help their patients understand
that if a problem arises, they can still bring a claim, and that the
system in which they may do so has its own set of procedural rules
and ways of ensuring fair evaluation and compensation. Patients
should know how and why parties choose a neutral arbitrator and
what the likely credentials of the neutral would be.
Health care providers at all levels need to provide written
information and access to staff who are available to answer any
questions patients may have about submitting a claim to ADR. If
patients have a positive attitude about ADR, then whatever
additional staff and materials providers would have to pay for
would more than pay for themselves in time saved and initial stages
of litigation avoided.
B. Careful Drafting
As the case law shows, providers must carefully draft
arbitration agreements to withstand judicial scrutiny. Not only is
the content of these clauses crucial, but so are their location within
166
the contract and their visual appearance.
C. Content
Because the use of ADR is growing and because an ADR
program was one of the proposed elements of the “Patient’s Bill of
167
Rights,” a multi-disciplinary commission convened in the late
166. See Havens, supra note 155, at 15 (describing that California requires
arbitration agreements to appear in the first article of the contract and that an
additional warning in at least ten-point red font is to appear immediately before
the signature line).
167. Aimee E. Bierman, A Modest Proposal: Model Arbitration Provisions in the Age
of Managed Care, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 173, 174 n.6 (1999) (stating that the
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1990s to develop guidelines for a model ADR system in the medical
168
The commission’s proposed agreement included the
field.
169
following: the scope of the agreement, who would administer the
process, some procedural elements relating to when and how the
process would work, how the parties choose neutral arbitrators, and
170
how fees are paid. The agreement should also explicitly state that
by signing, one is giving up the right to a court or jury trial, but also
that the agreement is not a prerequisite to health care, and that the
171
agreement is revocable within a certain time frame.
The Buraczynski court provided valuable guidance by
specifically mentioning both the positive and negative aspects of
172
the arbitration agreement. Using the proposed agreement above
and the Buraczynski discussion, the following sections provide
Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution (CHCDR) issued a report to
President Bill Clinton in March of 1998 urging the adoption of the “Patient’s Bill
of Rights”).
168. Id. at 174. The goals of CHCDR, which was composed of representatives
from the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, and the
American Arbitration Association, were to promote due process safeguards and
encourage greater understanding, awareness, and acceptance of ADR in the
context of managed care. Id. at 174-75.
169. The actual text of the proposed agreement read:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Managed
Care Organization contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by
binding arbitration. The arbitration process will be administered by
the American Arbitration Association under its Health Care Claim
Settlement Procedures, and judgment on the award rendered by the
arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
The controversy or claim will be submitted to arbitration upon the
written demand of one of the parties directed to the other party. The
arbitration process shall commence within the following time frames:
acute emergencies—24 hours; general emergencies—72 hours; nonemergencies—45 days. Three (3) arbitrators will be selected, within
ten (10) days of notice to the AAA of the existence of the dispute. If
either of the parties fails to agree to any of the arbitrators named, the
AAA is empowered to appoint the arbitrator(s) as necessary. The
initiating party shall advance one-half of the AAA fees that are
operative at the time of filing; the opposing party will pay the
remainder. By signing this agreement you are agreeing to have any
dispute regarding health care coverage decided by the aforementioned
arbitrators and you are giving up your right to a court or jury trial. This
agreement to arbitrate is not a prerequisite to health care or treatment
and it may be revoked by the member or his legal representative within
sixty (60) days after execution by notifying the MCO in writing.
Id. at 175-76.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Tenn. 1996).
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additional concrete suggestions for health care providers to use in
drafting a fair and sound arbitration agreement.
D. Tell Patients the Truth
Any arbitration clause in the health care context should say
clearly that by signing the contract, he or she is giving up the right
173
Educating patients as to what they are getting in
to a jury trial.
return should serve to balance uneasiness they may feel in signing
such an agreement.
E. Do Not Make Patients Bear a Heavy Financial Burden
Courts do not generally look kindly on agreements that
174
require the patient to bear the burden of the fees up front. Since
most medical malpractice attorneys accept cases on a contingency
fee basis, asking claimants to come up with a significant chunk of
money at the beginning of the process may effectively make it
impossible for them to proceed. Thus, even if a patient stands to
recover the money at a later point, health care providers must
ensure that the cost of arbitration does not stand in the way of
people bringing a claim.
F. Make Signing the Agreement Optional
While the growing trend is to require patients to sign these
agreements as a prerequisite to treatment, health care providers
should make it optional. Adequate education and counseling for
patients presented with options, as well as the ability to ask
questions of staff about ADR procedures, should counteract much
of the reticence. Making arbitration a choice rather than an
obligation will serve to protect patients’ procedural due process
rights and will bolster the legitimacy of a signed arbitration
agreement in the unlikely event a claim should arise.
G. Make the Agreement Revocable
Making the agreement revocable further ensures that a court
will enforce it. As with making arbitration optional, giving a patient
the choice to revoke the agreement within a set period increases

173.
174.

Bierman, supra note 167, at 176.
Id.
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fairness for patients. Allowing patients to revoke an agreement
within sixty days, for example, may seem like a risk, but the benefits
to health care providers through increased fairness and patient
confidence in the agreement will outweigh any possible risk.
H. Make the Agreements Mutual
While courts do not always require mutuality of an arbitration
agreement for it to be enforceable, ensuring that the agreements
bind both patient and provider is a good idea. The Buraczynski
court noted this as a factor working in favor of clause
175
enforceability.
I.

Do Not Limit Liability

For the agreements to withstand close scrutiny, they must not
change the health care provider’s duty to the patient in any way by
176
limiting liability for a breach of that duty.
J.

Do Not Bury It

Keep the arbitration agreement on a separate sheet of paper
177
It either
entitled “Physician-Patient Arbitration Agreement.”
should be near the front of any long contract or handed to a
patient separately while drawing his or her attention to it.
K. Use Big, Bold Type and Clear Language
It is not appropriate to write an arbitration clause in fine print.
While providers must balance the need to be clear with the desire
not to assault patients with an aggressive typeface that gives people
a negative impression of ADR, the agreement should be easy to
understand and easy to see. It might help to highlight salient
portions such as the fact that one is giving up his right to sue, but
not his right to be compensated for any wrong. Providers could
also highlight the optional nature of the agreement as well as a
patient’s ability to revoke.

175.
176.
177.

Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 321.
See id.
See id.
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L. Encourage People to Ask Questions
The clause should contain not only an explanation of what
arbitration is, but also should encourage the patient to discuss
questions with the physician or with some person specifically
178
designated for that purpose.
Implementing these safeguards and continuing to educate the
public as to the benefits of arbitration versus litigation ideally will
serve to free up the court system from unnecessary litigation
regarding the validity of the arbitration agreements themselves.
Health care insurers and providers should work to make their
patients feel better about signing an arbitration agreement and
promote fair agreements, even in the context of an adhesion
contract. Such steps will benefit not only the providers, but also
patients and taxpayers through lower premiums and state health
care costs.
V. CONCLUSION
The medical establishment is caught between containing
escalating costs for both patients and doctors and providing quality
health care to patients. One solution to managing these sometimes
competing goals is to provide access to a viable alternative dispute
resolution system. Managed care organizations cannot do this,
however, by forcing patients into forgoing the right to a jury trial
against their will. The health care industry can tackle this problem
in two ways: first, by helping people understand that giving up the
right to trial does not mean they will lose the opportunity to hold
their providers accountable should a dispute arise; and second, by
giving patients a choice. Vigilantly implementing procedural
safeguards and educating patients about arbitration will help to
create an environment in which people trust their health insurers
and providers, where they can receive fair treatment in an
equitable forum, and where health care professionals, and
ultimately taxpayers, can reserve precious time and money for what
really matters—making patients better.

178.

See id.
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